? provides an overview of career ambitions by prospective electoral system. Now, we report the results from additional analysis of voting participation and attendance. In particular, we first limit the votes to legislative votes only.
Then, we limit the investigation to close votes, e.i. votes where the difference between the number of yes and no votes is less than 100. In Table ? ? we report the result form the analysis of voting participation in legislative votes. Our two key findings remains. First, the estimate for those with a national career ambition are lower than for those with European career ambition. Second, the difference in participation between national and European level career is larger in candidatecentered systems than in party centered systems. This holds for both measures of career ambitions.
In Table ? ? we only investigated participation in close votes. By close, we mean that the difference between Yes and No votes was less than 100. Again, we see that the two key findings hold up for both measures of career ambitions.
1 Table A2 : Hierarchcial Binomial Models: Participation in Legislative Roll Call Votes (all, daily, all,survey) . Estimates are posterior mode and 95 percent posterior probabilty intervals.
Then, in Table ? ? we control for national parties specific effects by replacing the political group and country specific intercepts with national party intercept.
The main pattern in the results is similar to those reported above. 
